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Identity, Nature and Ground 
Published in Philosophical Topics, Vol. 30(1), 2002, pp. 167-87 
 
By Joel Katzav 
 
 
 
What does the qualitative identity of objects consist in? A standard response is that it 
consists in the possession of properties and relations. If all of an object’s properties and 
relations are specified, all there is to be specified about its qualitative as opposed to its 
numerical identity will have been specified. Another response adds that kinds, conceived 
of as an irreducible category of entity, also play a part in fixing the qualitative identities 
of objects. In what follows, two arguments are offered according to which these views are 
insufficient. Both lead to the conclusion that the qualitative identities of objects consist in 
part in their natures being grounded in what differs from entities, that is to say in 
something like conditions for the possibility of entities. The idea of such grounding will 
be clarified, and some of the criteria of adequacy for theses about it will be spelled out. 
Further, the implications of the claim that the natures of objects are grounded for the 
problems of the one and the many will be discussed. 
 
I. Identity, Properties, Relations and Kinds 
Properties are (or can be) possessed by objects, and are (or can be) ways in which objects 
differ or are alike. Relations are (or can be) possessed by objects, and are (or can be) 
ways in which ordered n-tuples of objects differ or are alike.1 It is common to suppose 
that the qualitative identity of an object consists just in all its properties and relations. 
                                                 
1 The possibility that there are properties of properties that are not possessed by objects is not considered 
here. Nothing of significance will turn upon this. 
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This view is inevitable given two recently pervasive conceptions of objects. The first 
conceives of objects as bundles of properties united by what Bertrand Russell called a 
relation of compresence.2 Thus, it allows only properties and relations to contribute to the 
qualitative identities of objects. The second conceives of objects as comprising bare 
particulars, that is to say substrata devoid of properties, and the properties and relations 
that these possess.3 While this view does recognize bare particulars over and above 
properties and relations, it too can recognize only properties and relations as contributing 
to the qualitative identities of objects. Bare particulars are, by definition, devoid of 
features. They are merely supposed to individuate objects, and thus to allow an account 
of numerical diversity. 
 But not all agree that properties and relations exhaust the qualitative identities of 
objects. Some follow Aristotle in supposing kinds to be an irreducible ontological 
category. Objects, they claim, are instances of kinds. On the other hand, they claim, 
objects possess properties and relations.4 For these Aristotelians, then, the qualitative 
identity of objects consists not only in their properties and relations but also in the kinds 
that they are instances of. 
 For brevity, let us say that an object’s nature includes just its properties, its 
relations and, if kinds are to be acknowledged as a distinct category, the kinds it is an 
instance of. The present paper’s claim will then be that the qualitative identities of objects 
consist in more than their natures. The view that dominates the current debate about the 
                                                 
2 Proponents of the bundle view include G. F. Stout (1921-3), Russell (1948), B. Blanshard (1962), D. C. 
Williams (1986) and K. Campbell (1990).  
3 Proponents of the substrate view include C. B. Martin (1980) and D. M. Armstrong (1997). 
4 See, for example, M. J. Loux (1978) and E. J. Lowe (1998). 
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qualitative identities of objects is that their qualitative identities consist just in their 
natures. 
 
II. Ground and Nature 
How could the (qualitative) identities of objects consist in more than their natures? If 
their natures are grounded in what differs from entities. This idea needs to be clarified 
somewhat before it can be argued for. To begin with, we can acquire something of a 
negative idea of grounds that differ from entities by delimiting the class of putative 
entities. This class includes anything that, on some interpretation of the terms ‘property’ 
and ‘relation’, possesses (or can possess) properties or relations, or which is (or can be) 
an instance of a kind.5 Properties, relations and kinds also count as putative entities, even 
if they themselves are not supposed to possess properties or relations. The class of 
putative entities thus includes particulars, whether objects or tropes, abstract or concrete, 
existent or subsistent; it also includes universals, whether determinate or determinable, 
properties or relations or kinds.  
Something of a positive grip on the idea of grounds that differ from entities – 
henceforth simply grounds – can be acquired by considering one view about how the 
natures of objects and other entities might be grounded.6 Thus, consider the view that a 
ground is a condition for the possibility of the natures of entities. Each ground or 
condition would, on this view, contribute a distinct feature to entities’ identities, one that 
consists in their being grounded in a certain way. For example, one could hold that what 
                                                 
5 The question of which interpretations of ‘property’ and ‘relation’ are allowed here will be discussed 
below. 
6 One can think of the natures of entities other than objects in the same way as the natures of objects, that is 
to say in terms of properties, relations and kinds. However, nothing significant turns upon this in what 
follows. 
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conditions the possibility of entities conditions them so that, among other things, they 
have determinate spatio-temporal properties and relations. An entity’s spatio-temporality 
would then consist, in part, in its being subject to constraints that its condition imposes 
upon what it is for it to possess properties and relations, and upon which properties and 
relations it possesses.7 It would be wrong, on this view, to think of spatio-temporality as 
supervening on the determinate spatio-temporal relations and properties of entities. 
Rather, spatio-temporality is supposed to be a condition to which entities are subject, one 
that thus confers upon them the feature of being conditioned or grounded in a certain 
way. 
Notice that the use of the term ‘feature’ is here being extended to cover whatever 
is part of the identity of an entity, including those of its features that consist in its being 
grounded and thus that are not part of its nature. ‘Feature’ is not being used a synonym 
for ‘property’. Notice also that ‘condition for the possibility of’ is here supposed to be 
asymmetrical. If A conditions the possibility of B, B does not condition the possibility of 
A. This ensures that no entity can condition its own possibility, and thus that no entity can 
condition the possibility of entities in general. As is required, conditions for the 
possibility of entities are distinct from entities.8  
A few further comments in clarification are still in order. To begin with, the idea 
that the natures of objects are grounded can now be related to a number of familiar 
                                                 
7 Humeans such as D. Lewis (1983, p. 366) and B. van Fraassen  (1989, p. 182) tend to be sceptical about 
the very idea of such constraints. But since they suppose that an understanding of objects’ natures is 
available, they presuppose an idea of such constraints.  As will be argued, a grasp of objects’ natures 
presupposes a grasp of their grounds.  
8 Some might suppose an entity that necessitates both its own existence and that of all other entities, and 
thus an entity that is, in a sense, arguably a condition for the possibility of entities. Although I deny this is a 
real possibility, I need not maintain so here. I need only maintain that ‘being a condition for the possibility 
of entities’ can be understood in a way that allows us to further get a grip on how what differs from entities 
might ground entities. 
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ontologies. The above description of grounds as conditions for the possibility of entities 
will, of course, bring Kant to mind. On one reading of Kant, what he calls the 
transcendental subject is nothing but such a condition. As such, it cannot be an object. 
Moreover, and the significance of this will become evident as we proceed, it can neither 
be known nor have its features truly or falsely described. It cannot be known since, for 
Kant, knowledge is limited to knowledge of objects (1996, B267-74 & B295-315). And, 
nothing true or false can be said of its features since, on his view, truth consists in 
agreement of knowledge with its objects, and falsity in the disagreement of knowledge 
with its object (1996, B82-3). 
The above reading of Kant will not be further defended or elaborated on in detail. 
It is offered merely in order to assist in clarifying, and in orienting the reader to, the idea 
that the natures of objects are grounded. At the same time, care should be taken not to 
assimilate this idea to transcendental idealism. There are non-idealist views according to 
which the natures of objects are grounded. For example, Plato, who is traditionally 
interpreted as a metaphysical realist, writes that the Good is beyond essence, and further 
that it is the source of being and essence (1935, 509b). Here a case can be made, as 
Neoplatonists have, for thinking of the Good as what Plato supposes grounds the natures 
of entities, including the Forms and Sensible objects. 
Some, however, will be skeptical about the idea of grounds. In order to state that 
natures, and thus properties, are grounded, properties have been distinguished from those 
features of objects that consist in their being grounded. This, however, seems to 
presuppose a substantive account of what it is for something to possess properties. What, 
it might be asked, if the truth of “a has property F” merely consists in something’s being 
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true of a? Michael Devitt, for example, claims that “a has property F” is equivalent to “a 
is F”. He further endorses a semantics according to which “a is F” is true if and only if 
there is an x such that “a” designates x and “F” applies to x (1980, p. 435). If Devitt is 
correct, then insofar as subject terms designate objects and predicates apply to them, that 
is to say insofar as something is true of them, they possess properties. It would thus be 
incoherent to maintain that some truths about objects are about their features but not their 
properties. 
However, the views put forward in this paper are not in competition with 
positions such as Devitt’s. The present paper is concerned with the question, “What do 
the identities of objects consist in?” The claim that some of the features of objects are not 
properties is a partial response to this question. It is thus only in competition with 
positions that interpret “a has property F”, and indeed “a and b possess relation R” and “a 
is an instance of kind N”, in ways that tell us something about what the identities of 
objects consist in. Such interpretations include class, concept and predicate nominalism, 
and various forms of realism about tropes and universals. They do not include 
interpretations such as Devitt’s, even if some such interpretation somehow reflects 
standard usage. This is so since positions such as Devitt allow the term ‘property’ to 
apply to any feature of objects, and therefore imply nothing about what the identities of 
objects consist in.  
It is, then, accepted that the features of objects that consist in their being grounded 
are properties in Devitt’s sense of ‘properties’. At the same time, it is insisted that some 
truths about objects are about features but not about properties, relations or kinds. To 
allow this, suffice it that the terms ‘property’, ‘relation’ and ‘kind’ are here assigned - if 
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necessary, by stipulation - a rough extension, one that suffices in order to make 
sufficiently clear what is and what is not being rejected when the view that properties 
alone constitute the identities of objects is being rejected. The allowable interpretations of 
“a has property F”, “a and b possess relation R” and “a is an instance of kind N” are, 
therefore, taken to include only those that tell us something about what the identities of 
objects consist in. 
 So far, an attempt has been made to clarify how it might be that the identities of 
objects consist in more than their natures. To this effect, it has been said that some of the 
features of objects might consist in their being grounded in certain ways. Further, it has 
been said that one way of thinking of grounds is in terms of conditions for the possibility 
of entities. However, it still needs to be asked how, if grounds differ from entities and 
thus do not have natures, anything can be said of them. For example, is it not the case 
that, in saying of a ground that it conditions the possibility of objects, properties are being 
ascribed to it? There is no easy solution to this difficulty and some, including some 
Neoplatonists, go so far as to maintain the ineffability of grounds. 
 Nevertheless, enough will be said about discourse about grounds in order to show 
that it is not, on the face of things, meaningless. To begin with, notice that there is no 
problem with saying of objects that they are grounded in this or that way. In such 
statements, grounds are mentioned, but only in ascribing a feature to objects. Further, 
such statements need not imply that grounds have properties. They do imply that grounds 
ground objects in certain ways, but grounds can do so without possessing properties. One 
way of seeing that this is possible is by considering informative identity statements. 
Granting that grounds do not have natures leaves open the possibility that such identity 
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statements apply to them. For example, consider the possibility that the natures of objects 
are grounded in being. Endorsing this possibility does not preclude saying that grounding 
is numerically identical to being, and it allows identifying being with representing. In 
other words, it allows holding that grounding is being and that being is being represented.  
Of course, while identity statements about objects, e.g. that the evening star is the 
morning star, are true of objects partly in virtue of their natures, this cannot be supposed 
about grounds. In the case of grounds, identity statements have to be accepted as 
primitive. Thus, it is a mistake to interpret them as being about entities, whether these are 
supposed to be objects, properties, relations or kinds. Consider the following identity 
statements: 
(1) Being is being represented 
(2) To be is to be represented 
(3) For any object, its being is its being represented. 
It is tempting to think of (1) as being about a property, and perhaps as supervening upon 
statements such as (2). Further, it is tempting to think that (2), a statement about anything 
that has being, supervenes upon statements such as (3). However, the suggestion here is 
that (1) can be understood as an identity statement about grounds, one that is not 
reducible to other statements. Indeed, in establishing that objects are grounded, the 
present paper establishes that some statements that are akin to (1) are neither about 
properties nor reducible to statements such as (2) or (3). Moreover, since statements such 
as (1) entail statements such as (2) and (3), we can thus begin to see how statements 
about grounds can play a role in explaining certain truths about objects without implying 
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that grounds have properties. We can, accordingly, start to see how grounds might ground 
objects without possessing properties. 
 Notice that, if primitive identity statements apply to grounds, even statements 
with other forms can also do so. Indeed, they can do so if they supervene, or if they are 
reinterpreted so that they supervene, upon primitive identity statements. This claim will 
be illustrated in section VII. 
Finally, notice that, when it comes to grounds, it may well be that nothing true or 
false can be said of them, and thus that they cannot even be said to have properties in 
Devitt’s sense of ‘properties’. This would be the case if, as noted in describing Kant’s 
position, ‘true’ is understood in terms of something like statements’ agreement with 
objects and ‘false’ in terms of something like their disagreement with objects. We could 
then only meaningfully say that statements about objects presuppose, or do not 
presuppose, this or that claim about grounds.  
 
III. The Being of Entities 
Some sense has been made of the idea that the natures of objects and, more generally, of 
entities, are grounded. Thus it is appropriate to consider arguments for this idea. Two 
such arguments will be discussed. The second, which will be examined in section V, 
focuses on objects alone. The first, which will be called the Platonist argument, is more 
general and draws the conclusion that the natures of all entities, and therefore of all 
objects, are grounded.  
The Platonist argument suggests that the word ‘is’, as it is used both in 
predication and in expressing existence, stands for being, and that being grounds the 
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natures of all entities. This, for example, roughly seems to be Plotinus’ position. Plotinus 
thinks of the One as being beyond all predicates (1966, III.8.10.29-35). Moreover, he 
equates the One with existence, and says of it that it is that in virtue of which entities are 
entities (1966, VI.9.1.1 & 2.20).9,10 It also seems to be Martin Heidegger’s position. 
Heidegger equates being with what differs from entities (1996, 6 & 2000, 23-6, 67). He 
further maintains that the being of entities is relevant to what entities are: it is “that which 
determines beings as beings” (1996, 6).11 There are, to be sure, some senses of the word 
‘ground’ that are such that Heidegger may be seen as offering a critique of the claim that 
the natures of entities are grounded. In particular, Heidegger is read as worrying about 
and trying to overcome the idea of ground as substance or permanent presence.12 But the 
present investigation makes no such supposition about grounds.  
What, then, is the Platonist argument according to which being grounds the 
natures of entities? To begin with, it must be established that being is not an entity. 
Among others, Plotinus (1966, VI.9.1-3) and Heidegger (1996, 3-4 & 2000, 61-2), argue 
for this conclusion essentially thus: (1) Being is what the word ‘is’ expresses, whether 
when used in predication or in expressing existence. But since (2) ‘is’ applies to every 
entity, (3) an understanding of being, including an understanding of each entity’s being, 
is involved in any understanding of entities. Thus, (4) being cannot be identified with any 
entity.  
 Why does (3) imply (4)? Perhaps it can instead be supposed that there is some 
entity an understanding of which is involved in any understanding of entities. This seems 
                                                 
9 Platonists claim to find their ideas and arguments in Plato’s work, most notably in his Parmenides. 
10 L. P. Gerson argues that Plotinus identifies the One with existence itself (1990, p. 206). 
11 Translations of Heidegger’s work use the phrase ‘the being of beings’ rather than ‘the being of entities’. 
No distinction is intended here.  
12 See I. Thomson (2000). 
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wrong. It implies that there is a real distinction between that entity that is being and those 
other entities that are. But if there is such a distinction, the being of those other entities 
can be ‘put aside’ or conceptually abstracted from them while nevertheless leaving some 
of their features to be identified. In other words, it implies, contrary to (3), that we have 
an understanding of entities that does not involve an understanding of their being.13 
Thus, for example, if being were supposed to be a property that is involved in any 
understanding of entities, it would follow that there is a real distinction between the 
property that is being and other entities. But if there is such a distinction, the property that 
is being can be abstracted from those other entities while nevertheless leaving some of 
their features to be identified. In other words, it would be the case that, contrary to (3), 
we have an understanding of entities that does not involve an understanding of being.  
It may, of course, be claimed that there is a property F of an object D that is 
involved in any understanding of D. Thus, there would be an entity that is involved in any 
understanding of another entity. Nevertheless, there would, in this case, be properties 
other than F that are properties of D and that can be grasped without a grasp of F. By 
contrast, in the case of being we are supposing that there are no entities that can be 
grasped without a grasp of it. 
Being, it seems, is not an entity. This allows the Platonist argument to proceed to 
its conclusion. If any entity is to be, what the ‘is’ of predication and of existence stands 
for must let it be what it is. Since it does not stand for an entity, then some non-entity, the 
being of entities, must let them be what they are. In the terminology of this essay, being 
must ground the natures of entities.  
                                                 
13 Heidegger’s strategy is not quite that of the Platonist. He proceeds from (3) to (4) using a number of 
Aristotelian assumptions, including the assumption that if something is not definable through the proximate 
genus and the specific difference, it is not an entity. 
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How, then, is the Platonist argument to be responded to? To begin with, the 
Platonist appeal to the word ‘is’ is (knowingly) indifferent in that it covers its use in 
predication and in expressing existence. But if different uses of ‘is’ correspond to distinct 
meanings, perhaps it cannot, without equivocation, be said that all understanding of 
beings involves an understanding of being. 
 Even so, the conclusion that natures are grounded is likely to follow. If there are 
distinct senses of ‘is’, it is still likely that an understanding of at least one of its senses is 
involved in all understanding of entities. Specifically, the ‘is’ in ‘there is’ seems to be 
involved in all understanding of entities, even if its meaning is distinct from the meaning 
or meanings of the ‘is’ of predication. If this is correct, the Platonist argument will lead at 
least to the conclusion that existence, or whatever ‘there is’ stands for, grounds the 
natures of entities. But what if there is no single sense of ‘is’ that is involved in an 
understanding of all entities? The Platonic argument may yet be modified and made to 
work with respect to each of these senses, each one leading to the supposition of a 
distinct ground for the natures of entities.  
However, there is little point to thus modifying the Platonic argument here. It is 
subject to more fundamental worries. As Heidegger loved to write, it is tempting to put 
the word ‘is’ aside (2000, 24). It is tempting to think that the grammar of English and 
other languages requires its pervasive presence, but that one should not be too quick to 
draw ontological conclusions from this. Consider the ‘is’ of predication. In statements of 
the form “a is F” the word ‘is’ seems to stand for what is distinct from a and F. However, 
as we saw in discussing Devitt’s conception of statements of the form “a is F”, it is by no 
means clear that this word brings any ontological baggage with it. Perhaps, as 
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Christopher Williams would have it, the word ‘is’ is a superficial feature of English, one 
to be discounted (1992, p. 210). 
 So too with respect to ‘exists’ and ‘there is’, perhaps one should not be misled 
into thinking that because one is presented with a word, it must describe something. For 
example, if ‘exists’ had a similar meaning to ‘is part of my world’, it would not do so. 
Rather, it would be an indexical the function of which is to pick out or refer to the world 
in which it is used. To say that Napoleon exists, for instance, would be just to say that 
Napoleon is part of this world. It would not be to postulate an additional non-entity 
(being) over and above Napoleon.14  
Indeed, Herman Philipse rejects Heidegger’s concern with the being of beings on 
the ground that ‘exists’ does not have a descriptive or referential function (1998, p. 334). 
He supports this claim with the familiar argument that if a description is given to an 
imaginary object E, adding that E exists does not involve attributing an additional feature 
to it. After all, he claims, it would be absurd to say that E just as initially described could 
not exist. 
However, it is in fact not absurd to say that E as initially described could not exist. 
If E is initially described as something imagined and non-existent, it would be 
contradictory to say that it could exist as initially described. If, on the other hand, E’s 
initial description is neutral on the issue of E’s existence, it cannot be equivalent to a 
description that adds of E that it exists. Moreover, this has nothing to do with the 
meaning of ‘exists’. It merely reflects what was not initially said about E. Thus, if an 
initial description of E is neutral about E’s colour, it cannot be equivalent to another that 
                                                 
14 The suggestion that ‘exists’ is an indexical is modelled on Lewis’s suggestion that ‘actuality’ is an 
indexical (1973, pp. 85-6). 
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adds that E is blue. Here too, E when supposed to be blue cannot be just as initially 
described. Of course, giving a description to some imaginary object and then going on to 
say that it exists does not involve a contradiction. But this is precisely because in doing 
so it is not being supposed that the object just as initially described exists. 
Nor is the view that ‘exists’ is non-descriptive without serious worries. Panayot 
Butchvarov, for example, has argued at length that ‘exists’ is a descriptive term (1979, 
pp. 86-131). In any case, the considerations so far outlined according to which ‘is’ in its 
various uses does not have a descriptive function merely repeat Heidegger’s observation 
that it is for us an empty label, an observation that is but the starting point for much of 
Heidegger’s writing. Heidegger further tries both to explain why the word ‘is’ seems to 
be an empty label and to show that it nevertheless has a determinate meaning (2000, 38-
41 & 154). He also argues that it has a referential function (2000, 67). Thus, the above 
considerations cannot, in themselves, count against Heidegger’s appeal to the word ‘is’. 
Heidegger’s specific arguments to the effect that the word is not an empty label would 
have to be examined in detail. Moreover, they would have to be examined in terms that 
are fair to Heidegger’s position, that is to say in terms that do not involve accepting the 
obvious about the word ‘is’.15  
 Such an examination cannot be undertaken here - the concerns and modes of 
thinking at stake are too far apart - and nor is there an available sustained attempt to 
evaluate the two in terms that are fair to each. Thus, it will be no surprise that the issue of 
the meaning of the word ‘is’ will not be settled here, even if the Platonist argument can 
eventually be made to succeed. 
                                                 
15 Plotinus too claims that, and tries to explain why, the One has been forgotten (1966, V.1.1).  
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There may be an additional reason for worry about the Platonist argument. It may, 
after all, be argued that (2) is false, that is to say that the word ‘is’ does not apply to every 
entity. Levinas, for example, maintains that a human’s obligation to another human he or 
she encounters consists in an ethical relation that presupposes nothing about being 
(1981). Here too, however, the issue will not be settled, even if talk of an ethical relation 
that presupposes nothing about being does not and cannot, in the end, be made sense of. 
 
IV. Being and Ground 
Something significant can nevertheless be gleaned from the Platonist argument at this 
point. While it leaves open the issue of whether being grounds the natures of objects, it 
still supports the conclusion that objects’ natures are grounded. To begin with, if there are 
one or more terms that have a descriptive function and that apply to all entities, a grasp of 
what these terms stand for will be required in all understanding of entities. These terms 
will thus stand for one or more grounds. If there is only one such term, being may yet 
turn out to be what grounds the natures of entities. If not, it will be misleading to apply 
the term being to what does so. Nor is it hard to think of terms other than ‘is’ that might 
be thought to apply to all entities; candidates include the terms ‘unity’, ‘existent’ and 
‘entity’. 
 It is hard to envisage how there could be no terms with a descriptive function that 
are involved in all understanding of entities. After all, they are all entities. Still, what if, 
as Aristotle thought, it is so?16 It will then be possible to divide entities into two or more 
classes such that the Platonic argument can be modified and run with respect to each.  
                                                 
16 It seems that when Aristotle claims that there are many ways of being, he is, among other things, denying 
that everything has something in common (1924, B.1, 1059b31-34). 
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Take the class of all entities and divide it into classes such that it is true of each 
that (1) there is at least one descriptive term that applies to all and to only its members, 
and that (2) every property of any of its members is itself one of its members. This will 
always be possible. Clearly, we can divide the class of all entities into classes that are 
such that (1) applies to each of them. Further, the members of any class to which (1) 
applies can be conceptually modified by abstracting those of their properties that are not 
among the class’s members from them. The entities being conceived after such properties 
have been ‘removed’ will form a class that conforms to both (1) and (2).17 
 For each resulting class, it will be the case that there is at least one descriptive 
term the understanding of which is required for an understanding of any member within 
it. Use Φ to denote this term, a to denote what this term represents and C to denote the 
class that a is associated with. Then the Platonic argument can be run as follows: (1) a is 
what Φ represents. But since (2) Φ applies to every entity within C, (3) an understanding 
of a is involved in any understanding of entities within C. Thus, (4) a cannot be identified 
with any entity within C. Nor (5) can a be identified with any entity outside of C. Thus, a 
is not an entity. Rather, it grounds the entities within C. 
 Why does (3) imply (4)? Because otherwise there would be a real distinction 
between a and other entities within C. But this would imply, contrary to (3), that after 
excluding a from C there remain within it entities that can be grasped without an 
understanding of a. Why accept (5)? Because if a were an entity outside of C, the fact 
that Φ applies to entities would imply that they have a property that is not itself a member 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
17 It is, of course, not assumed that the entities being considered prior to the operation of abstraction are 
those being considered after abstraction. Entities need not survive the required loss of properties. So too, it 
is not assumed that the entities being considered after abstraction could exist without the properties that 
have been abstracted from them. The concern here is merely with their conceivability. 
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of C. But, by hypothesis, Φ applies only to the members of C, and its members include 
all the properties of its members. 
Here is an example: a dualist might argue that there is no single term a grasp of 
which is required for any understanding of entities. The dualist could maintain that an 
understanding of mental entities is possible using terms that are in no way involved in 
any understanding of physical entities. Even the term ‘entity’ would have to be limited so 
that it is used only within either the mental or the physical domain, or else its use would 
have to involve equivocation. Nevertheless, such a dualist would, it seems, have to accept 
that a grasp of at least one term, call it Ψ, is required for any understanding of mental 
entities, including their properties. Ψ would not stand for a mental entity. For, if it did, 
there would be a real distinction between what it stands for and other mental entities; and 
we could thus grasp some mental entities without a grasp of what it stands for. Nor would 
Ψ stand for a non-mental entity. For, if it did, the fact that it applies to mental entities 
would imply that such entities have a property that is not itself a mental entity. But if Ψ 
stands neither for a mental nor for a non-mental entity, it stands not for an entity but for 
what grounds mental entities. 
 It is concluded that entities’ natures are grounded. At the same time, the question 
as to what grounds entities’ natures is left open. Here, note, is one reason to prefer a 
concern with what grounds entities’ natures to a concern with the being of entities. The 
latter prejudges what grounds entities’ natures in that it tells us that this ground is being. 
Yet it may well be that this prejudgment is false. 
 
V. Sameness and Ground 
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It has been concluded that the natures of entities are grounded. This yields, as a special 
case, the desired result that the natures of objects are grounded. The next argument 
focuses on objects alone and aims to establish directly that their natures are grounded. It 
proceeds by considering aspects of difference and sameness between objects.  
Consider what is often referred to as the problem of the one over the many: how 
can numerically different objects share a common nature?18 How, for example, can 
different fascists share the property of being ruthless or different philosophers that of 
being thinkers? Only a certain ‘kind’ of sameness and difference is being considered 
here, namely sameness and difference between objects that are alike in what it is for them 
to share a nature. However, a more fundamental question about sameness may be asked: 
how can objects that differ in what it is for them to share a nature be the same? 
The question just posed does not presuppose that there actually are classes of 
objects that differ in what it is for them to share a nature. For example, it is not assumed 
that some actual objects conform to the strictures of resemblance nominalism and that 
other actual objects conform to the strictures of trope theory. Indeed, it is not even 
assumed that the objects in question are possible existents. It is only assumed that classes 
of objects that differ in this radical way and yet are alike are conceivable. Moreover, it is 
worth noting, saying that such resembling objects are conceivable is not the same as 
saying that they can conceivably coexist. Since all that is important here is that they are 
conceived of as being alike, the conceivability of their coexistence is beside the point. 
Granted only that such radically differing objects are conceivable and are understood to 
                                                 
18 More accurately, the problem is usually formulated in terms of the sharing of common properties rather 
than in terms of the sharing of common natures. The term ‘nature’ is used here as it is neutral about 
whether the identities of objects are comprised of properties alone or whether relations and kinds also play 
a part in their composition. 
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be alike, it may be asked what their being alike is supposed to consist in. So too, it may 
be asked about actual objects what it is about their identities that makes them akin to 
objects that are conceived as differing from them in what it is to share a nature. 
That objects conceived in accordance with different conceptions of what it is to 
share a nature can be alike is easy to see. Consider, for example, two views about what it 
is for an object to possess a nature: natural class nominalism and realism about 
universals. According to natural class nominalism, naturalness is a primitive feature of 
some classes of objects, and for an object to possess a property is just for it to belong to 
such a class.19 According to realism about universals, the possession of a property 
consists in the instantiation of a universal or repeatable.20 Now, objects conceived in 
accordance with these positions are the same in that they conform to metaphysical 
realism, that is to say (very roughly) to the view that to be is to be independent of 
interpretation or belief. In what, then, does this sameness of identity consist? 
Since we are considering objects that conform to different conceptions of what it 
is for objects to share a nature, the sameness in question cannot consist in the sharing of 
some nature. So long as there is no equivocation in the use of the terms ‘property’, 
‘relation’ and ‘kind’, such objects cannot have the same properties and relations; and they 
cannot be instances of the same kinds. The sameness in question cannot, for example, 
consist in the sharing of one or more universals. Nor can it consist just in the objects in 
question belonging to the same natural class. There must, therefore, be more to the 
identities of objects than their natures. 
                                                 
19 Lewis offers an example of natural class nominalism (1983). 
20 Armstrong offers an example of realism about universals (1997). 
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It might be objected that the above merely reveals that both natural class 
nominalism and realism about universals are misguided. If either of these conceptions of 
objects’ natures is accepted, one is left with the difficult conclusion that sameness in 
identity is not merely sameness in natures. But if a minimalist conception of properties is 
adopted, this conclusion can be avoided. Consider, once again, a view of properties that is 
akin to Devitt’s. On this view, recall, all there is to an object’s having a particular 
property is its having something true about it. But granted this view, objects that conform 
to natural class nominalism and objects that conform to realism about universals do share 
properties simply in that there are some statements that are true of both classes of objects. 
However, the present concern is with the identities of objects. Thus, the question 
of how objects that differ in what it is for them to share a nature can be the same is here 
identified with the question of what it is about the identities of such objects that allows 
them to be the same. But, as was pointed out in section III, positions such as Devitt’s are 
neutral about such questions. To be sure, it is now appropriate to observe that this 
neutrality is subject to the condition that there is a single sense of ‘true’ that applies to 
objects that differ in what it is for them to share natures. However, if this condition is not 
met then, once again, sameness between objects that conform to different views about 
what it is for objects to share natures will not consist in the sharing of natures. 
 Nor does anything significant turn upon the fact that natural class nominalism and 
realism about universals have been chosen in order to establish that sameness is not 
merely sameness of natures. Other conceptions of what it is for objects to share natures 
will do. Compare, for example, Kant’s position on this issue with Plato’s. On Kant’s 
view, what objects are is dependent upon the transcendental subject along with its 
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categories and forms of intuition. On Plato’s view, at least during his middle period, one 
cannot even say of objects that they are, but only that they become. Moreover, their 
becoming depends upon the Forms, including the Form of the Good, and upon the 
Receptacle of becoming. Plato does admit that the Forms are. However, these are 
(roughly) conceived in accordance with metaphysical realism, and thus do not have 
natures in the same sense as Kantian objects do. Clearly, then, Plato and Kant differ on 
what objects’ sharing of natures consists in. Nevertheless, some of the objects they 
suppose are, in some ways, the same. For example, both Kant’s objects and Plato’s are 
dependent objects. Further, there are ways in which Kant’s objects are like Plato’s Forms. 
For example, both Kant and Plato agree that what is is essentially intelligible. For Kant, 
objects are, and are intelligible. For Plato, the Forms are, and are intelligible. By 
hypothesis, this sharing of intelligibility cannot be interpreted as sharing of properties or 
relations, or as consisting in the instantiation of common kinds.  
 Thus, in conceiving of sameness between objects that differ in what it is for them 
to share a nature, sameness between objects is seen not to be merely sameness in natures. 
Once again, the conclusion that the identities of objects consist in more than their natures 
must be drawn. But this is merely to say that the natures of objects are grounded. Natures 
are all that entities can contribute to the identities of objects. After objects’ properties and 
relations have been specified, along with the kinds of which they are instances, all entities 
that are relevant to their identities have been specified. The only remaining option, then, 
is that the identities of objects also consist in their natures’ being grounded.  
 How, exactly, does being grounded solve the problem of sameness between 
objects that differ in what it is for them to share natures? The suggestion is that such 
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objects share some features, even if they do not share properties or relations, and are not 
instances of the same kinds. More specifically, the natures of the objects in question are 
grounded, and they are grounded in similar ways. This sameness of grounding is what the 
objects’ sameness consists in. To return to Plato and Kant, the intelligibility that Kant’s 
objects and Plato’s Forms share is to be understood in terms of their being similarly 
grounded. According to Plato, the Form of the Good makes things intelligible. According 
to Kant, the transcendental subject does so. 
 But what, it might be worried, if there are ways in which objects are the same as 
grounds? Would not this sameness also consist in sameness of grounding, and thus lead 
to the supposition that grounds are grounded? After all, this sameness could not consist in 
sameness of natures since entities alone possess natures. But, then, it might seem, a 
vicious regress threatens. Would not objects be, in some ways, the same as what grounds 
grounds, leading to the supposition of yet further grounds, and so on?  
 There is, however, no reason to suppose that a problematic regress arises here. It 
may be that what grounds the natures of objects itself requires, in some sense, grounding. 
This possibility will be briefly illustrated in section VII. But whether or not grounds are 
grounded, objects should not be supposed to be in some way the same as grounds. 
Moreover, this much should follow from the assumption that grounds do not have 
natures.  
 It might not be obvious that the assumption that grounds do not have natures can 
ensure that objects are in no way the same as them. Recall that one way of describing 
grounds without ascribing natures to them is through the use of informative identity 
statements that apply to grounds, and that are, supposedly, primitive or not reducible to 
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other statements. But, even granting this suggestion and thus that grounds do not have 
natures, if the ‘is’ of identity also applies to objects, it would seem to follow that grounds 
are akin to objects in whatever this ‘is’ ascribes to them. So too, it would follow that, in 
at least one sense, grounds are.  
Nevertheless, if the suggestion that primitive identity statements apply to grounds 
suffices to illustrate how grounds might not have natures, it suffices to illustrate how a 
ground might differ from objects to such an extent that they are in no way the same as it. 
Assume that primitive identity statements completely describe grounds. It follows that, if 
there are ways in which grounds and entities are alike, these will, ultimately, be 
specifiable in terms of identity statements that apply both to grounds and to entities. But 
since identity statements that apply to entities ascribe natures to them, no identity 
statement will apply both to entities and to grounds. Hence, it is not the case that grounds 
and entities are in some ways the same. And where a term applies to grounds, say where 
‘being grounded’ does so, it cannot also be applied to entities without equivocation. For 
in the case of grounds, but not in the case of entities, its application would ascribe to 
grounds what can be described using primitive identity statements. 
 The observation that identity statements that apply to grounds never apply to 
entities also assists in dealing with an as yet untouched upon issue that the Platonist 
argument gives rise to. The Platonist argument attempts to establish that terms that are 
involved in any understanding of entities, or in any understanding of some class of 
entities, stand for grounds. Since the ‘is’ of identity is arguably involved in any 
understanding of entities, the Platonist argument can be run with respect to it.21 But if the 
                                                 
21 Heidegger, of course, does not fail to include the ‘is’ of identity (that applies to entities) among those that 
he supposes stand for being (1960, p. 16). 
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‘is’ of identity stands for grounding, it would seem that identity statements affirm that 
what they apply to is grounded. If this were accepted with respect to the identity 
statements that apply to grounds, the worrying conclusion that all grounds are grounded 
would follow. But if the ‘is’ of identity that applies to entities stands for grounding, it is a 
descriptive term that applies to entities. As such, it cannot feature in identity statements 
that apply to grounds. That it stands for grounding, then, would imply nothing about what 
primitive identity statements stand for. 
 
VI. Problems with Conceptions of Grounds 
The argument of the previous section aims to establish that the natures of objects do not 
suffice to fix what it is for objects to share a nature, and thus that they do not suffice to 
fix the identities of objects. It does so by considering conceivable cases of sameness 
between objects that differ in what it is for them to share a nature. Perhaps, however, 
focusing on what it is for existing objects to share natures would allow the same point to 
be made. After all, it seems implausible to suppose that what it is for an object to have a 
nature should depend upon which objects happen to exist.  
But enough has been said in support of the view that the natures of objects are 
grounded. What remains now is to consider a number of additional problems that are 
faced by this view. The aim in doing so will not be to solve these problems but to further 
clarify the conclusions of this paper, and to partly clarify what an adequate conception of 
grounding for object’s natures consists in. It will also be to recast the problems of the one 
over the many and of the many over the one in light of the supposition that objects’ 
natures are grounded. 
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  To begin with, consider the ‘relation’ between objects’ natures and their ground 
or grounds. It is the whole of an object’s nature that is grounded. While grounds differ 
from entities, one cannot as it were consider objects’ natures or some aspect of objects’ 
natures apart from their grounding. One problem, then, is to clarify the sense in which 
objects are thus immanent in their grounds. 
 Of course, the task of determining the sense in which objects’ natures are 
immanent in their ground or grounds is only one part of the task of determining what 
grounds the natures of objects. Another is that of determining which terminology, if any, 
is appropriate to describing such grounds. Kant’s terminology of conditions for the 
possibility of entities is only one option here. Another would involve following up Plato’s 
designation of the Good as what grounds the natures of entities by attempting to 
understand grounds in normative terms.22  
As to the possibility that no terminology is appropriate to grounds, the radical 
differences between entities and grounds make it quite real. However, so long as some 
such suggestion as that primitive identity statements apply to grounds is in the running, it 
seems more plausible to accept that the reasons for supposing that the natures of objects 
are grounded are reasons for supposing that something like primitive identity statements 
apply to grounds. 
Consider another issue that the discussion of grounds raises: what is at stake in 
investigation into what grounds the natures of objects? Simply saying that the truth about 
such grounds is at stake may not do. For one thing, it may, as has been seen, be that 
claims about grounds are neither true nor false. Further, it is far from clear that there is 
any sense of ‘true’ and ‘false’ that is neutral between views that differ on what grounds 
                                                 
22 This seems to be Levinas’ position. 
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the natures of objects, and thus which will allow one to maintain that one such view is 
true and another is false. Nor would it do to suppose that what is at stake is what there is. 
There can be no supposition that the term ‘exists’ applies to grounds, even if the natures 
of objects are grounded. This is so partly because existence may well be what grounds 
objects, and it may make no sense to say of existence that it exists. More generally, given 
the difference between grounds and entities, it cannot simply be assumed that the term 
‘exists’, a term that applies to entities, also applies to whatever grounds objects.  
 
VII. The One and the Many 
How should the problem of the one over the many be formulated in light of the 
conclusion that the natures of objects are grounded? The problem that is usually referred 
to as the problem of the one over the many is that of how numerically different objects 
can share a common nature. What is hidden in this problem can now be made clear. It is, 
in fact, a problem about objects that share a common ground. It thus presupposes a 
solution to the more fundamental problem of how it is possible for the natures of different 
objects to share the same ground. Sameness of and difference between objects 
presupposes a more fundamental, different, sameness and difference.  
 Note that the problem of how the natures of different objects can share the same 
ground is intimately tied to the already introduced problem of clarifying the sense in 
which objects are immanent in their grounds. A solution to one would be a solution to the 
other.  
 Recall, once again, the view that grounds are conditions for the possibility of the 
natures of objects and other entities. This view does not, in itself, explain how such 
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conditions could constrain the natures of diverse objects. Indeed, as it stands, this 
construal is incomplete in that it does not specify how objects are, or indeed that they are, 
immanent in what conditions them. More, then, needs to be said about grounds construed 
as conditions. Taking another leaf out of Kant’s conception of grounds illustrates what 
this more might be. One can suggest that (1) for objects to be is for them to be 
represented from a (numerically) unique perspective, and that (2) for objects to be 
represented from a unique perspective is for them to be represented in accordance with 
certain rules.23 (1) and (2) are informative identity statements, each of which offers 
additional information about what differs from entities and conditions the possibility of 
objects’ natures. Thus, an object’s being represented from a unique perspective is its 
being grounded. It is neither one of its relations nor an abstraction from one of its 
relations. This allows us to say that an object is immanent in its ground in that it cannot 
exist apart from its being represented from a certain unique perspective. It also offers an 
explanation of how different objects can share a common ground. They can do so 
because different objects can be represented from the same perspective. 
 This ‘Kantian’ position requires further elaboration. However, it will do for 
present purposes, that is to say as a tool for bringing into better focus the problem of how 
diverse objects can share a common ground, and for illustrating how this problem might 
be solved. To return to the problems of the one over the many, there is a third such 
problem. In what, it might be asked, does sameness between different grounds consist? 
This problem arises because, as was argued in establishing that objects’ natures are 
grounded, grounds that differ while nevertheless being the same are conceivable. It may 
                                                 
23 These examples are formulated in terms of the view that being grounds the natures of entities. Nothing 
turns on this. One can modify the exams so that ‘unity’ or some other term designates the ground in 
question.  
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also arise because it is conceivable that different existing objects have different grounds. 
For example, what grounds the natures of persons may differ from what grounds the 
natures of material objects. But these different grounds would nevertheless be alike in 
that they are grounds. 
The above is particularly worrying because saying of grounds that they are alike 
seems to involve attributing natures to them. And this worry would be aggravated if, in 
addition, the Platonist argument were successfully extended so that it established that the 
natures of objects are, after all, grounded by being. If they are so grounded, then it seems 
that one cannot say of grounds that they are alike in some respect. To do so would seem 
to distinguish them from being.  
Once again, the idea that grounds may be described through primitive identity 
statements is the easiest way of trying to avoid attributing natures to grounds even when 
they ‘are alike’. On this suggestion, differing identity statements apply to different 
grounds. But where such grounds ‘are alike’, the identity statements in question 
presuppose, but are not presupposed by, a common further identity statement. Differing 
grounds thus presuppose a common ground. Here is a very rough example of how this 
might work: 
(1) Being is being intelligible 
(2) Being immaterial is being for oneself 
(3) Being material is being for another 
(2) and (3) purport to capture respective grounds for the natures of objects that differ in 
what it is for them to share a nature, and thus in their grounding. (1) purports to capture 
part of what (2) and (3) presuppose, namely their common ground. And since these 
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grounds are grounded in being, there is no problem in saying of them that they are 
grounded in the same way. 
 There remain complementary problems to the problems of the one over the many, 
namely those of the many over the one. The problem of how an object can have different 
properties is often said to be the problem of the many over the one. However, given that 
objects are grounded, it is conceivable that the nature of a given object is grounded in 
diverse grounds. If so, there will be a problem of how a single object can have different 
grounds. For example, it is conceivable that the difference between having a moral 
obligation and having red hair is no mere difference in natures, but is also a difference in 
grounding. If so, what grounds having a moral obligation in a given person would be 
different from what grounds having red hair in that person, and the issue of how this is 
possible will have to be dealt with. 
 Finally, there may yet be a further layer to the problem of the many over the one. 
What grounds the natures of objects may, in some sense, have a structure. In other words, 
what grounds the natures of objects may contain diversity in unity. The above example of 
how diverse grounds might share a common ground may be reinterpreted in this way. So 
too, Kant’s transcendental subject somehow contains within it the diversity of categories 
and corresponding conditions for the possibility of experience. The result of such 
complexity would be a problem of how one ground can contain a diversity of grounds. 
In sum, it is alleged that there are three problems concerning the one over the 
many. First, there is the problem of how numerically different objects can share 
properties. Second, there is the problem of how numerically different objects can share a 
common ground. Third, there is the problem of how different grounds can be the same in 
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respect of their being grounds. It is further alleged that corresponding to each of these 
worries about the one over the many there is, or at least threatens to be, a problem about 
the many over the one. 
 It is not, however, the case that there are now up to six independent problems. 
Rather the problems under consideration form a hierarchy, thus allowing that a solution 
to a more fundamental problem will yield a solution to less fundamental ones. Indeed, 
perhaps a solution to the most fundamental of these problems will yield a solution to all 
the rest. For example, the most superficial of the above problems, namely those of how 
numerically different objects can share properties and of how a single particular can have 
different properties, are likely to be solved through an understanding of how different 
objects can share a common ground. After all, such an understanding would include an 
understanding of what it is for an object to share a nature.  
 
VIII. Concluding Remarks 
The natures of objects are grounded, even if what such grounding consists in is an open 
issue. Settling this issue requires settling the problems of the immanence of objects in 
their grounding, of the terminology appropriate to grounding and of the nature of disputes 
about such grounding. It also requires dealing with the various problems of the one over 
the many and the many over the one. There are, however, additional problems for 
conceptions of grounding. Among these is the problem of the methodology appropriate to 
investigation into what grounds the natures of objects. All discourse about objects 
presupposes claims about their grounds. Thus, it is hard to see how one could ask, “What 
grounds the natures of objects?” as opposed to, “What is presupposed about what grounds 
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the natures of objects?” The question, then, is whether there is a method that allows one 
to ask what grounds the natures of objects. And if not, perhaps, as has been suggested 
was Kant’s view, knowledge of what grounds the natures of objects is not possible. There 
are also additional points of contact between recent debates in metaphysics and the 
observation that the natures of objects are grounded. The points of contact already 
discussed are the debates about the nature of identity, and about the one over the many 
and the many over the one. Another point of contact is the problem of the nature of laws 
of nature. Whatever grounding the natures of objects have, it explains, or they explain, 
some of the features of objects. It is thus natural to identify some laws of nature with 
what grounds, or with statements about what grounds, the natures of actual objects. The 
reader will, no doubt, see additional issues relating to grounds. But, it is hoped, enough 
has been said to indicate that grounds should be an ongoing concern for 
metaphysicians.24 
                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 Thanks to Christopher Hill, Sam Inglis and Eric Olson for their comments on this paper. 
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